The Diploma Mills of Departure
Inside the Training Center Cartel: How a ₱45 Billion Industry Sells Worthless Certificates to Desperate Workers
The certificate hangs on the wall of her family’s home in Laguna, framed and displayed with pride. It declares that she has completed 600 hours of training in commercial cooking, certified by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, qualifying her for employment as a hotel cook anywhere in the world.
She paid ₱47,500 for that certificate. Her family borrowed from a 5-6 lender to cover the cost. The training center promised that the certificate would open doors to kitchen jobs in Dubai, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia. They showed her job orders. They showed her testimonials from graduates now working in five-star hotels. They showed her a future.
That was three years ago. She has never worked as a cook abroad. She has never worked as a cook anywhere. The job orders were expired or fabricated. The recruitment agency connected to the training center stopped responding after she completed the course. The certificate that hangs on her wall is worth less than the frame that holds it.
Her name is Jennifer. She is twenty-seven years old. She works at a fast food restaurant earning ₱450 per day. She still owes ₱31,000 on the loan she took for training that led nowhere. Every month, she pays interest on a debt incurred for a future that never materialized.
“They showed me everything,” she said. “Photos of hotels, salary computations, success stories. They made it seem like the job was already waiting. All I had to do was complete the training and I would be deployed.”
“I finished top of my class. I passed all the assessments. I got my certificate. And then nothing. The agency said the job order was cancelled. They said to wait. I waited for two years. Nobody called.”
“The certificate means nothing. The skills mean nothing. I learned to cook dishes I will never make in any restaurant. I learned to plate food for hotels that will never hire me. I paid ₱47,500 to learn nothing useful.”
Jennifer is one of approximately 2.5 million Filipinos who enroll in technical-vocational training programs annually, seeking the credentials that overseas employment requires. She is one of hundreds of thousands who discover that the training industry has mastered the art of selling hope and delivering nothing.
This is the training center cartel: a sprawling network of schools, assessment centers, and recruitment agencies that has transformed aspirational workers into revenue sources. It is an industry that generates an estimated ₱45 billion annually by selling certificates of questionable value to people who cannot afford to discover their worthlessness. It is a system where the connection between training and employment has been severed, where credentials have become commodities divorced from skills, where the promise of overseas work has been weaponized into an extraction mechanism.
This is how the cartel operates. This is who profits. This is who pays.
Part 1: The Architecture of Extraction
The Training Landscape
The Philippine technical-vocational education sector is vast, fragmented, and poorly regulated despite nominal government oversight.
The numbers:
The Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) oversees technical-vocational education and training (TVET) in the Philippines. As of recent data:
Total registered TVET institutions: Approximately 4,500 Private training centers: Approximately 3,200 (71%) Public institutions: Approximately 1,300 (29%) Annual enrollees: Approximately 2.5 million Annual graduates: Approximately 2.1 million Annual assessment takers (for National Certificates): Approximately 1.8 million Annual certificate passers: Approximately 1.4 million
The program distribution:
Training programs cluster around perceived overseas employment demand:
Domestic work and caregiving: Household services, caregiving, elderly care. These programs target the massive domestic worker market in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Gulf countries, and increasingly Europe and North America.
Hospitality: Food and beverage services, housekeeping, front office, commercial cooking, bartending. These target hotels and restaurants in Gulf countries, cruise ships, and Asian tourism destinations.
Healthcare support: Caregiving, health care services, massage therapy. These target the global care economy.
Welding and construction: Shielded metal arc welding, gas tungsten arc welding, pipefitting, scaffolding. These target Gulf construction projects.
Electronics and manufacturing: Electronics assembly, machine operation. These target factory work in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia.
Maritime: Various seafarer qualifications, though maritime training is somewhat separate from the general TESDA ecosystem.
The geographic concentration:
Training centers concentrate where aspiring OFWs concentrate:
Metro Manila: Highest concentration, particularly in areas like Quezon City, Manila, Caloocan, and Pasay where recruitment agencies cluster.
Central Luzon: Pampanga, Bulacan, and Nueva Ecija have significant training center presence.
Southern Tagalog: Laguna, Batangas, Cavite serve the large population near Manila.
Visayas: Cebu is a major training hub for both land-based and maritime workers.
Mindanao: Davao and General Santos have growing training sectors.
The quality spectrum:
Training centers exist across a vast quality spectrum:
Legitimate institutions: Well-equipped facilities, qualified instructors, genuine skills development, honest job placement support. These exist but are a minority.
Adequate institutions: Acceptable training, reasonable facilities, some skills development, limited job placement. The middle ground where many programs fall.
Marginal institutions: Minimal facilities, unqualified instructors, cursory training, misleading job placement claims. A significant portion of the market.
Predatory institutions: No meaningful training, fabricated credentials, false job promises, pure extraction operations. More common than anyone admits.
The Business Model
Understanding the training center cartel requires understanding its business model: how money flows, who captures value, and where workers fit in the equation.
Revenue streams:
Training centers generate revenue from multiple sources:
Tuition fees: The primary revenue source. Fees range from ₱5,000 for basic programs to ₱100,000 or more for specialized certifications. Average fees for OFW-oriented programs cluster around ₱15,000 to ₱50,000.
Assessment fees: Fees for National Certificate assessments, typically ₱1,000 to ₱5,000 per assessment. Centers that are also accredited assessment centers capture this revenue directly.
Materials and supplies: Charges for uniforms, tools, textbooks, and supplies. Often marked up significantly from actual cost.
Miscellaneous fees: Registration fees, laboratory fees, certification fees, documentation fees. These add ₱2,000 to ₱10,000 to total program cost.
Placement fees: Some centers charge explicit placement fees for job referrals. Others receive commissions from recruitment agencies for referrals.
Repeat business: Workers who fail assessments or need additional certifications pay again. Some centers design programs to require multiple courses.
Cost structure:
Training center costs are substantially lower than fees suggest:
Facilities: Many centers operate from minimal spaces: converted commercial units, residential buildings, or shared facilities. Capital investment is often low.
Equipment: Equipment quality varies wildly. Some centers invest in proper training equipment. Others use outdated, non-functional, or insufficient equipment. Students may never touch the equipment they are supposedly trained on.
Instructors: Instructor qualifications and compensation vary. Some centers employ qualified professionals at reasonable salaries. Others employ unqualified instructors at minimum wage or below, sometimes paying per class rather than full-time.
Curriculum: TESDA provides training regulations and curriculum frameworks. Centers adapt these, but curriculum development cost is minimal for most programs.
Overhead: Rent, utilities, administration, marketing. Marketing is often the largest expense, as centers compete for enrollees through aggressive promotion.
Profit margins:
The gap between fees and costs creates substantial margins:
Conservative industry estimates suggest: Average tuition fee: ₱25,000 Average direct cost per student: ₱8,000 to ₱12,000 Average contribution margin: ₱13,000 to ₱17,000 per student (52% to 68%)
For centers with high volume and minimal investment, margins can exceed 70%.
The volume game:
Profitability depends on volume. A center with 50 students per batch, four batches per year, at ₱25,000 per student generates ₱5 million in annual tuition revenue. With a 60% margin, profit reaches ₱3 million.
Scale this to larger operations with multiple programs, multiple locations, and thousands of annual enrollees, and profits reach tens of millions.
The incentive structure:
This business model creates specific incentives:
Maximize enrollment: Revenue comes from enrollment. More students mean more revenue, regardless of whether students benefit.
Minimize costs: Profit comes from the gap between fees and costs. Cutting corners on facilities, equipment, and instruction increases profit.
Promise broadly: Enrollment requires promises. Job placement promises, salary promises, success promises attract students. Whether promises are fulfilled is less relevant than whether they drive enrollment.
Maintain throughput: Students who complete programs and pass assessments can be cited as statistics. Completion rates matter for marketing and accreditation. This creates pressure to pass students regardless of actual competence.
Avoid accountability: When students do not get jobs, centers can blame external factors: market conditions, agency failures, student shortcomings. As long as the training was “completed,” the center has fulfilled its nominal obligation.
The Certification Machinery
At the center of the training ecosystem is the National Certificate (NC) system administered by TESDA.
The NC system:
TESDA issues National Certificates at various levels (NC I through NC IV and National Diplomas) certifying competence in specific skill areas. These certificates are supposed to demonstrate that holders can perform specific tasks at defined competency standards.
For many overseas jobs, employers and destination countries require National Certificates or equivalent credentials. This makes the NC essential for OFW deployment and creates demand that drives the training industry.
The assessment process:
To obtain an NC, individuals must pass a competency assessment:
Assessment centers: TESDA accredits assessment centers (often training centers with additional accreditation) to conduct assessments.
Assessors: Certified assessors (individuals who have completed assessor training and certification) administer assessments.
Competency-based assessment: Assessments are supposed to be competency-based, testing whether candidates can actually perform required tasks, not just answer questions.
Fees: Assessment fees range from approximately ₱1,000 to ₱5,000 depending on the program.
Results: Candidates either pass (competent) or fail (not yet competent). Passing candidates receive NCs.
The certification numbers:
Annual assessment and certification statistics: Assessment takers: Approximately 1.8 million Passers: Approximately 1.4 million Overall pass rate: Approximately 78%
These numbers suggest a functioning certification system. But the numbers mask significant problems.
The certification problems:
Assessment capture: Many assessment centers are the same institutions that provide training. They assess their own students. The conflict of interest is obvious: passing students generates positive statistics that attract future enrollees.
Assessor compromises: Assessors may have relationships with training centers, may be pressured to pass students, or may be directly corrupted. An assessor who fails too many students may not be invited back.
Competency theater: Assessments may be conducted but not rigorously. Students may be coached immediately before assessment. Practical tasks may be simplified. Evaluations may be lenient.
Paper credentials: The NC becomes a paper credential that does not reliably indicate actual competence. Employers discover this when workers cannot perform tasks their certificates claim they can perform.
Inflation: Pass rates remain high even as actual competence does not. The certificate loses meaning but retains symbolic value in the employment pipeline.
Part 2: The Recruitment Connection
The Training-Recruitment Pipeline
The most extractive training centers do not operate in isolation. They operate as part of integrated pipelines that connect training to recruitment, capturing workers at the training stage and channeling them toward agency fees.
The vertical integration:
Some recruitment agencies own or control training centers directly:
Ownership: Agency owners establish training centers as separate corporations, sometimes with family members as nominal owners to obscure the connection.
Referral arrangements: Agencies and centers have formal or informal referral agreements. Centers send graduates to specific agencies; agencies send applicants to specific centers.
Shared facilities: Some agencies and centers share physical locations, with training occurring in one part of the building and recruitment processing in another.
Common management: The same individuals may manage both training centers and recruitment operations, even when nominally separate.
The horizontal networks:
Beyond vertical integration, networks of training centers and agencies cooperate:
Referral commissions: Centers receive commissions (₱2,000 to ₱10,000 per worker) for referring graduates to agencies. Agencies receive commissions for referring applicants to centers.
Preferred relationships: Agencies designate preferred training centers whose graduates they prioritize. Centers promote these relationships to attract enrollees.
Package deals: Some operations offer combined training and placement packages: pay one fee for both training and job placement. These packages obscure how much goes to training versus recruitment, enabling overcharging on both.
The job order bait:
The most deceptive practice involves using job orders to sell training:
Display job orders: Centers display copies of job orders (employer requests for workers) in their facilities, suggesting immediate employment opportunity.
Promise connection: Centers promise that completing their training will position graduates for these specific jobs.
Create urgency: “Only 20 slots remaining,” “employer visiting next month,” “deployment in 90 days.” Urgency language pressures enrollment decisions.
Reality: Job orders may be expired, already filled, from agencies with no connection to the center, or entirely fabricated. The connection between displayed job orders and actual employment opportunity may not exist.
The certification requirement leverage:
Recruitment agencies leverage certification requirements to drive training enrollment:
Employer requirements: Agencies tell applicants that employers require specific certifications. This may be true, partially true, or false.
Agency requirements: Some agencies impose their own certification requirements beyond what employers actually require, directing applicants to specific training centers.
Upgrade pressure: Workers with basic certifications are told they need additional or higher-level certifications to access better jobs. This drives repeated training purchases.
The Information Asymmetry
The training-recruitment pipeline thrives on information asymmetry: trainees do not know what they do not know.
What workers do not know:
Actual job market: Workers do not know how many positions actually exist in their target occupation, how many graduates compete for those positions, or what realistic placement rates are.
Certification value: Workers do not know whether their specific certification will actually be recognized and valued by employers abroad.
Training center quality: Workers cannot easily evaluate training center quality before enrolling. Facilities can be staged for tours. Success statistics can be fabricated.
Agency connections: Workers do not know which agencies are actually connected to which training centers, or whether claimed connections are real.
Alternative paths: Workers may not know about lower-cost or more legitimate training options, including public TESDA programs that charge minimal fees.
What workers are told:
Guaranteed placement: Verbal assurances that completing training guarantees job placement. These assurances are rarely in writing and disappear when questioned later.
High salaries: Salary ranges that represent the top of the market or are entirely fictional. Workers plan their finances around income that may never materialize.
Fast deployment: Timelines of weeks or months when realistic timelines are often years or never.
Strong demand: Assurances that demand for their occupation is high and growing when markets may actually be saturated.
Success rates: Statistics on graduate placement that are fabricated, inflated, or based on definitions that obscure failure (counting any employment as success, ignoring those who gave up looking).
The information control:
Training centers and agencies actively manage information:
Testimonial staging: Success stories may be real but unrepresentative, completely fabricated, or paid promotions.
Photograph manufacturing: Photos showing graduates “at work” abroad may be staged, stolen from other sources, or from the rare genuine placements used to represent typical outcomes.
Credential display: TESDA accreditation documents, agency licenses, and employer partnerships are displayed prominently. Workers assume these credentials guarantee legitimacy.
Review suppression: Negative reviews online may be suppressed through various means. Workers who complain may be threatened with legal action for defamation.
Part 3: The TESDA Problem
The Regulatory Framework
TESDA is mandated to regulate technical-vocational education and ensure quality. On paper, the regulatory framework appears robust.
TESDA’s regulatory functions:
Registration: Training institutions must register with TESDA to operate legally.
Program accreditation: Training programs must meet TESDA standards for curriculum, facilities, equipment, and instructors.
Assessment accreditation: Assessment centers must meet additional standards to administer competency assessments.
Compliance monitoring: TESDA is supposed to monitor registered institutions for ongoing compliance with standards.
Enforcement: TESDA can sanction institutions that violate standards, including suspension or revocation of registration.
The Unified TVET Program Registration and Accreditation System (UTPRAS):
TESDA’s accreditation system requires institutions to meet specific standards:
Curriculum: Programs must follow TESDA training regulations specifying competencies, hours, and content.
Facilities: Physical facilities must meet minimum standards for space, safety, and appropriateness.
Equipment: Training equipment must meet specifications for type, quantity, and functionality.
Instructors: Trainers must hold relevant National Certificates and trainer methodology certifications.
Systems: Institutions must have quality management systems, student tracking, and administrative processes.
The apparent rigor:
Applications for registration and accreditation require extensive documentation. TESDA conducts compliance audits. Institutions that fail to meet standards can be denied registration or have registration revoked.
This appears to be a functioning regulatory system. The reality is different.
The Regulatory Gaps
Despite nominal oversight, predatory training centers thrive because regulation fails at multiple levels.
Registration without quality:
Low barriers: Meeting minimum registration requirements is not difficult. The requirements establish floors so low that almost any operation can meet them initially.
Documentation focus: Registration emphasizes documentation over reality. Having the right papers matters more than having actual capacity.
Snapshot compliance: Registration evaluates a moment in time. Institutions can prepare for registration visits and then reduce quality afterward.
Volume overwhelms capacity: With approximately 4,500 registered institutions, TESDA cannot meaningfully evaluate each one. Registration becomes a bureaucratic process rather than a quality filter.
Accreditation theater:
Gaming the system: Institutions learn what TESDA inspectors look for and prepare accordingly. Equipment may be borrowed for inspections. Facilities may be cleaned and staged. Documentation may be fabricated.
Inspector relationships: In a system with repeated interactions, relationships develop between inspectors and institution operators. These relationships may compromise rigor.
Corruption vulnerabilities: The accreditation process creates opportunities for corruption. Inspectors who can approve or deny accreditation hold power that can be monetized.
Minimal spot-checking: Unannounced compliance visits are rare. Institutions know when to expect evaluation and can prepare.
Assessment capture:
Self-assessment conflicts: Training centers that assess their own graduates have obvious conflicts of interest. They have financial incentives to pass students.
Assessor pressure: Assessors who work with training centers repeatedly may face pressure to maintain high pass rates. Centers can stop inviting assessors who fail too many students.
Competency definitions: What counts as “competent” is subject to interpretation. Lenient interpretation passes more students.
Limited oversight: TESDA cannot observe every assessment. Most assessments occur without direct TESDA oversight.
Enforcement weakness:
Complaint-driven: TESDA primarily responds to complaints rather than proactively identifying problems. Workers who are victimized rarely complain. Those who do face bureaucratic processes with uncertain outcomes.
Slow processes: Investigation and enforcement take time. Institutions can operate for months or years while cases are pending.
Weak penalties: Penalties for violations may be insufficient to deter. A fine that is a fraction of profits from violations does not create meaningful deterrence.
Regulatory capture: Industry voices are well-represented in TESDA policy discussions. Worker voices are less present. Regulations may be shaped by those who benefit from weak oversight.
The Accountability Void
When training fails to lead to employment, no one is accountable.
The blame diffusion:
Training centers blame agencies: “We provided good training. The agencies did not place the graduates.”
Agencies blame training centers: “The graduates were not adequately prepared. Their training was insufficient.”
Both blame workers: “The worker did not interview well. The worker had unrealistic expectations. The worker did not follow up.”
Both blame the market: “Demand decreased. Employers changed requirements. Economic conditions changed.”
Nobody blames the system: The systemic design that allows extraction without accountability is never examined.
The evidence destruction:
Time delays: By the time workers realize they have been victimized, months or years have passed. Evidence is harder to gather. Memories fade. Documents disappear.
Verbal promises: The most damaging promises are made verbally. “We will place you within 90 days.” “Your training guarantees employment.” Nothing in writing means nothing provable.
Institutional impermanence: Some training centers close and reopen under new names. They shed liabilities while maintaining operations.
Worker dispersal: Victimized workers are scattered, isolated, and unorganized. They do not know each other and cannot coordinate claims.
The legal barriers:
Cost of pursuit: Legal action is expensive. Workers who lost money on training cannot afford to pursue legal remedies.
Small individual claims: Individual losses of ₱20,000 to ₱50,000 are significant for workers but too small for lawyers to pursue on contingency.
Evidence burdens: Proving fraud requires evidence that workers may not have preserved.
Institutional advantages: Training centers can afford lawyers. They can outlast workers in legal proceedings.
Part 4: The Money Trail
The ₱45 Billion Extraction
Estimating total extraction by the training center cartel requires assembling scattered data.
The enrollment numbers:
TESDA reports approximately 2.5 million TVET enrollees annually. Not all are in private, fee-charging programs. But the majority are.
Conservative estimate of enrollees in private, OFW-oriented programs: 1.5 million annually
The fee levels:
Fees vary widely by program and institution:
Low-end programs (basic domestic work, caregiving): ₱8,000 to ₱20,000 Mid-range programs (hospitality, food service): ₱15,000 to ₱40,000 Technical programs (welding, electronics): ₱20,000 to ₱50,000 Premium programs (specialized healthcare, maritime-related): ₱30,000 to ₱100,000+
Weighted average across OFW-oriented programs: Approximately ₱25,000 to ₱35,000
The calculation:
1.5 million enrollees x ₱30,000 average fee = ₱45 billion in annual tuition revenue
This does not include: Assessment fees (add ₱2 billion to ₱3 billion) Materials and supplies markups (add ₱3 billion to ₱5 billion) Related charges and miscellaneous fees (add ₱2 billion to ₱3 billion)
Total estimated annual extraction: ₱50 billion to ₱55 billion
The profit portion:
If average profit margins are 50% to 60%, industry profits reach ₱25 billion to ₱33 billion annually.
This is profit extracted from workers who can least afford it, often borrowed at high interest, for training that frequently leads nowhere.
Who Captures the Value
The ₱50+ billion flows to various parties in the training ecosystem.
Training center owners:
The primary beneficiaries are training center owners. The industry is fragmented, with thousands of centers, but ownership is often concentrated:
Family networks: Many centers are family-owned, with multiple family members operating centers under different names.
Serial operators: Experienced operators may own multiple centers, sometimes across different regions or program areas.
Recruitment agency principals: Agency owners who also own training centers capture value at multiple points.
Political connections: Some training center owners have political connections that provide protection and access.
The wealthiest training center operators have built substantial fortunes. Multi-million peso homes, vehicle fleets, and investment portfolios funded by student fees.
Instructors and staff:
Instructors and staff capture a small share of revenue:
Instructor compensation: Ranges from minimum wage to modest professional salaries. Rarely exceeds ₱30,000 to ₱50,000 monthly for qualified instructors. Part-time instructors may earn ₱5,000 to ₱15,000 monthly.
Staff compensation: Administrative and support staff typically earn minimum wage to slightly above.
Share of revenue: Personnel costs typically represent 15% to 25% of tuition revenue. The remainder goes to facility costs, overhead, and profit.
Recruitment agencies:
Agencies capture value through referral commissions and placement fees:
Referral commissions: Agencies that refer applicants to training centers receive ₱2,000 to ₱10,000 per enrollment.
Placement fees: Workers who complete training and seek agency placement pay additional placement fees, often exceeding legal limits.
Combined extraction: A worker may pay ₱30,000 for training and another ₱50,000 to ₱200,000 in placement fees. The training-recruitment pipeline extracts at every stage.
Marketing and recruitment agents:
Training centers use agents to recruit students:
Agent commissions: Agents who recruit enrollees receive commissions of ₱1,000 to ₱5,000 per student.
Sub-agents: Some agents use sub-agents, creating multi-level commission structures.
Community recruiters: In some areas, community figures (teachers, local officials, church members) receive payments for steering students to specific centers.
Facilitators and fixers:
The margins in the system create space for various facilitators:
Assessment fixers: Individuals who claim to facilitate passing assessments for fees.
Accreditation fixers: Individuals who claim to help centers pass TESDA inspections.
Placement fixers: Individuals who claim to expedite job placement for fees.
These fixers may or may not deliver what they promise. Their existence indicates a system where outcomes are perceived as purchasable.
The Debt Financing
Many workers finance training through debt, adding interest costs to direct fees.
Financing sources:
Family borrowing: Parents, siblings, and extended family contribute or lend funds. This often depletes family resources or creates family debt.
Formal lending: Banks, cooperatives, and microfinance institutions provide education loans. Interest rates range from 12% to 36% annually.
Informal lending: 5-6 operators and local loan sharks charge 20% monthly or more. Workers desperate to start training accept predatory terms.
Center financing: Some training centers offer financing, either directly or through affiliated lenders. These arrangements may include interest rates and terms that compound costs.
The interest burden:
A worker who borrows ₱30,000 for training at 5-6 rates (20% monthly) and takes six months to complete training and begin job search:
Principal: ₱30,000 Interest (20% x 6 months, compounded): Approximately ₱59,000 Total owed: ₱89,000
If the job search takes another year, with interest continuing: Total owed: Approximately ₱150,000 or more
The ₱30,000 training investment becomes a ₱150,000 debt. If the training does not lead to employment, the worker owes five times the original training cost with no income to pay it.
The debt trap:
Training debt creates traps:
Sunk cost commitment: Workers who have borrowed for training feel committed to continue. They may borrow more for additional certifications, for placement fees, for whatever the system demands.
Desperation deployment: Workers in debt may accept any overseas job, even exploitative ones, to begin earning and paying down debt.
Family liability: Family members who co-signed or contributed become liable for training debt. Family relationships strain under financial pressure.
Generational transfer: Unpaid training debt may burden families for years, affecting siblings and children.
Part 5: The Skills Gap
What Training Should Provide
Legitimate technical-vocational training should provide:
Technical competencies:
Workers should learn to actually perform the tasks their occupation requires:
Practical skills: Hands-on ability to complete work tasks. A trained cook should be able to cook. A trained welder should be able to weld. A trained caregiver should be able to provide care.
Knowledge foundation: Understanding of principles, safety, and theory underlying practical skills.
Current practices: Training aligned with current industry standards and practices, not outdated methods.
Equipment familiarity: Experience with equipment actually used in the workplace.
Employability skills:
Beyond technical skills, workers need:
Language proficiency: Communication ability in English or destination country language.
Workplace behavior: Understanding of workplace norms, professionalism, and expectations.
Cultural awareness: Understanding of destination country culture and expectations.
Problem-solving: Ability to handle unexpected situations and adapt.
Credential value:
Credentials should represent actual competence that employers recognize and trust:
Reliable signaling: The certificate should accurately indicate what the holder can do.
Employer recognition: Employers should trust and value the credential.
Competitive positioning: The credential should distinguish holders from those without it.
What Training Actually Provides
In predatory training centers, what is delivered falls far short of what is needed.
Minimal practical training:
Insufficient hours: Programs may claim 600 or 800 hours of training but deliver far less. Students may be present for the hours but not actively trained.
Observation over practice: Students may watch demonstrations rather than performing tasks. They may handle equipment once rather than developing proficiency.
Outdated methods: Training may teach methods no longer used in actual workplaces. Equipment may be generations behind what employers use.
Insufficient equipment: Ten students may share one workstation. Time with actual equipment may be minutes rather than hours.
Theoretical focus:
Classroom heavy: Programs may emphasize classroom instruction over practical training because classrooms are cheaper to operate than workshops.
Memorization focus: Assessment preparation may emphasize memorizing answers rather than developing capability.
Paper competence: Students learn to pass tests without learning to perform tasks.
Language gaps:
Inadequate English training: Many OFW jobs require English communication. Training centers may not adequately develop English skills.
No destination language: Jobs in Japan, Korea, Germany, and elsewhere may require local language proficiency that training centers do not provide.
Employability gaps:
No soft skills: Training may ignore professionalism, workplace behavior, and communication skills.
Cultural unawareness: Workers may not be prepared for cultural differences in destination countries.
Unrealistic preparation: Training may not prepare workers for the actual conditions they will face.
The Competency Reality
When trained workers reach employers, the gap between credential and capability becomes apparent.
Employer discoveries:
Employers who hire Filipino workers with certifications often find:
Basic task inability: Workers cannot perform basic tasks their certificates claim they can do.
Equipment unfamiliarity: Workers have never used the equipment they are expected to operate.
Language limitations: Workers cannot communicate adequately in the required language.
Workplace behavior gaps: Workers do not understand workplace norms and expectations.
The consequences:
When competence gaps are discovered:
Immediate termination: Workers may be fired when inability becomes apparent, leaving them stranded abroad.
Extended training: Employers may have to provide additional training, resenting that supposedly trained workers require it.
Reduced wages: Workers may be demoted to lower positions with lower pay than promised.
Reputation damage: Filipino workers as a whole suffer reputation damage when individual workers reveal credential meaninglessness.
The feedback failure:
Information about competency gaps rarely flows back to improve training:
Geographic distance: Employer complaints are far from training centers.
Broken communication: Communication chains between employers, agencies, and training centers are weak.
Incentive misalignment: Training centers have no incentive to learn about graduate failures.
Blame diffusion: When failures occur, all parties blame others rather than improving.
Part 6: The Predatory Playbook
Recruitment Tactics
Predatory training centers use specific tactics to recruit students.
The school visit program:
Target schools: Representatives visit high schools and colleges, particularly in areas with high OFW aspiration.
Career counseling disguise: Presentations are framed as career counseling or opportunity awareness rather than sales pitches.
Dream selling: Presentations emphasize overseas success stories, high salaries, and transformed lives.
Teacher cooperation: Some schools cooperate in exchange for payments or relationships. Teachers may actively encourage students to enroll.
Parent targeting: Evening sessions target parents, emphasizing how their children can achieve overseas success.
The community marketing:
Barangay presence: Representatives establish presence in communities with high migration tradition.
Success story deployment: Actual or fabricated success stories from the community are prominently shared.
Referral programs: Community members receive payments for referring enrollees.
Church partnerships: Some centers partner with churches, presenting at services or community events.
Local official endorsement: Endorsements from barangay captains or other local officials lend credibility.
The social media machine:
Facebook advertising: Targeted ads reach aspiring OFWs with promises of training that leads to guaranteed employment.
Success story content: Social media profiles feature testimonials, photos of graduates “working abroad,” and salary information.
Group infiltration: Representatives participate in OFW aspiration groups, promoting training as the path to success.
Influencer partnerships: Some centers partner with social media influencers, including supposed OFWs who promote training.
The urgency creation:
Limited slots: “Only 15 slots remaining for the next batch.” Urgency pressures immediate enrollment.
Employer deadlines: “The employer needs workers by next month. You must enroll now to be considered.”
Price increases: “Tuition will increase next month. Enroll now for the current rate.”
Scholarship expiration: “This scholarship offer expires Friday.” Fabricated scholarships create urgency.
Retention and Extraction
Once students enroll, centers employ tactics to maximize extraction.
The add-on sale:
Additional certifications: After enrollment, students are told they need additional certifications for better placement. Each additional certification costs more.
Supplemental training: Language classes, computer classes, soft skills training are sold as necessary additions.
Materials and supplies: Required materials are sold at marked-up prices. Students cannot use alternatives.
Assessment fees: Fees for assessments, sometimes multiple attempts, add to total cost.
The extension trap:
Incomplete training: Students may reach the end of scheduled training without completing all requirements. Extensions are offered for additional fees.
Failed assessments: Students who fail assessments are offered additional training and reassessment for additional fees.
Upgraded certificates: After completing NC II, students are sold on the need for NC III or additional specializations.
The placement promise maintenance:
Continued hope: Even after training completion, centers maintain hope of placement to prevent complaints.
Wait instructions: Students are told to wait for opportunities. Waiting can extend for months or years.
Additional requirements: Students are told they need additional documentation, medical exams, or other requirements (often fee-generating) to complete placement.
Blame shifting: When placement does not occur, blame shifts to agencies, employers, or market conditions. Never to the training center.
The complaint suppression:
Delay tactics: Complaints are met with promises that placement will happen soon. Workers wait rather than escalate.
Legal threats: Workers who complain publicly may receive legal threats for defamation.
Community pressure: In small communities, complaining against a training center with local relationships brings social pressure.
Documentation barriers: Without clear documentation of promises made, workers struggle to prove claims.
Part 7: The Human Toll
The Financial Devastation
Training center victims suffer financial harm that extends far beyond tuition fees.
The direct costs:
Tuition: ₱15,000 to ₱100,000+ depending on program Materials and supplies: ₱2,000 to ₱10,000 Assessment fees: ₱1,000 to ₱5,000 Transportation and living costs during training: ₱10,000 to ₱30,000 for those who travel for training Documentation and processing: ₱3,000 to ₱10,000
Total direct costs: ₱30,000 to ₱150,000 or more
The indirect costs:
Opportunity cost: Time spent training is time not spent earning. Workers may forego months of income.
Interest costs: Borrowed funds accumulate interest throughout training and job search.
Follow-on costs: Placement fees, additional training, documentation costs add to investment.
The debt burden:
For a worker who borrows ₱50,000 for training and job search at 5-6 rates:
Original borrowing: ₱50,000 Interest after 6 months: Approximately ₱65,000 Interest after 12 months: Approximately ₱130,000 Interest after 18 months: Approximately ₱260,000
Workers who do not find overseas employment within months face compounding debt that can exceed a year’s local salary.
The family impact:
Family resources depleted: Family savings used for training leave no cushion for emergencies.
Family debt: Family members who borrowed are liable for debt.
Collateral at risk: Land, property, or assets used as collateral may be seized.
Intergenerational burden: Training debt may burden family for years.
The Psychological Damage
Beyond financial harm, training center victimization produces psychological impacts.
The hope destruction:
Workers who invested in training as a path to overseas opportunity experience hope destruction when that path closes:
Dream collapse: The envisioned future disappears. Overseas work, higher income, family provision all become unavailable.
Investment waste: The sacrifice made for training was meaningless. Time, money, and effort produced nothing.
Future uncertainty: With the planned path closed, workers face uncertainty about what to do next.
The shame burden:
Filipino culture emphasizes family obligation and success demonstration. Training failure produces shame:
Self-blame: Workers blame themselves for being deceived, for not seeing through promises, for failing.
Family shame: Workers feel they have shamed families who invested in their training.
Community shame: In small communities, everyone knows who trained and did not deploy. Failure is visible.
Comparison pain: Others who trained at the same time may have deployed successfully (or appear to have). Comparison intensifies shame.
The trust damage:
Victimization damages ability to trust:
Institutional distrust: Workers lose trust in training centers, agencies, and government oversight.
Interpersonal distrust: Workers become suspicious of offers, opportunities, and people who make promises.
Self-distrust: Workers lose trust in their own judgment, having been deceived once.
The mental health impacts:
Depression: Financial devastation combined with hope destruction and shame produces depressive symptoms.
Anxiety: Debt pressure and uncertain futures create chronic anxiety.
Suicidal ideation: In severe cases, workers facing overwhelming debt and no prospects experience suicidal thoughts.
Victim Voices
Mario, 32, Zambales (welding training, no deployment after three years)
“I paid ₱38,000 for SMAW training. The center said they had connections with agencies recruiting for Qatar and UAE. They showed us job orders. They said welders were in high demand. They said we would deploy within six months.
“I finished training. I passed NC II. I was proud. I thought my life was about to change.
“That was three years ago. The agency the center referred me to took my resume and said they would call. They never called. I followed up for months. Eventually they stopped answering.
“I went to other agencies. They said the market for welders had changed. They said I needed additional certifications. They said I should train more.
“I could not afford more training. I had borrowed for the first training. The interest was growing. I had to stop looking for overseas work and find any job to start paying.
“I work in a local auto shop now. I earn ₱12,000 monthly. I pay ₱3,000 monthly on my training debt. At this rate, I will pay for another four years.
“The certificate is in a folder somewhere. I cannot look at it. It reminds me of what I believed and what actually happened.
“The training center is still operating. They still show job orders. They still promise deployment. Every batch, new students believe what I believed.”
Rosemarie, 29, Cebu (caregiving training, deployed but job did not match training)
“I trained as a caregiver. NC II Caregiving. The center said there was huge demand in Canada and Europe. They said caregiving was the best path to working abroad.
“After training, the agency connected to the center did not have caregiving jobs. They had domestic helper jobs. They said it was similar. They said I could work as a domestic helper and eventually move to caregiving.
“I was desperate. I had debt from training. I took the domestic helper job in Kuwait.
“The work was nothing like caregiving. I cleaned, cooked, washed clothes. I was not caring for anyone. I was a maid. The training I paid for was useless.
“The salary was lower than what the center had promised for caregiving. I earned $400 monthly, not the $800 to $1,200 they had shown us. After deductions, I sent home ₱12,000 monthly.
“It took me four years to pay off the training debt and save enough to come home. Four years of work that I did not train for, at wages lower than promised.
“Was the training worth it? No. I could have found a domestic helper job without NC II Caregiving. The certificate did nothing for me. The center just wanted my money.”
Eduardo, 45, Iloilo (multiple trainings, never deployed)
“I am the stupid one in my family. That is what they say. I paid for training three times. Three times I believed. Three times nothing happened.
“First time, 2015, electronics production line. ₱22,000. The center said Samsung and other factories in Korea and Malaysia were hiring. After training, the jobs did not materialize. The center said demand had changed.
“Second time, 2017, industrial sewing. ₱18,000. My sister lent me money. The center said garment factories in Taiwan were desperate for workers. After training, the agency said I was too old for factory work at 37.
“Third time, 2019, massage therapy. ₱25,000. I borrowed from a 5-6. The center guaranteed hotel spa jobs in Dubai. After training, COVID happened. Then recovery, still no jobs.
“₱65,000 in training fees. Plus interest, plus living costs during training, plus all the expenses. I have paid more than ₱150,000 for certificates that got me nothing.
“My family does not trust me anymore. When I talk about opportunities, they laugh. They say I am easily fooled. Maybe they are right.
“I work on a fishing boat now. The same work my father did. All the training, all the money, and I am back where I started. Worse than where I started, because I have debt.
“I tell young people in my barangay: do not believe the training centers. They want your money. They do not care if you get jobs. But the young people do not listen. They believe like I believed.”
Part 8: The Reform Landscape
What TESDA Says
TESDA acknowledges challenges while emphasizing its efforts and constraints.
Official positions:
TESDA publicly commits to quality assurance and recognizes that some institutions do not meet standards. Official statements emphasize:
Regulatory efforts: Ongoing compliance monitoring, institution audits, and enforcement actions.
System improvements: Efforts to strengthen UTPRAS, improve assessor training, and enhance quality assurance.
Resource constraints: Limited personnel and budget to oversee thousands of institutions.
Shared responsibility: Quality is a shared responsibility among TESDA, institutions, industry, and students.
Enforcement statistics:
TESDA occasionally releases enforcement statistics:
Compliance audits conducted: Several hundred annually Institutions sanctioned: Dozens annually (suspensions, revocations, warnings) Programs closed: Various non-compliant programs ordered to close
These numbers represent a small fraction of the total institution population, suggesting that enforcement is limited relative to the problem scale.
What Reform Would Require
Meaningful reform would require changes at multiple levels.
Regulatory strengthening:
Increased enforcement capacity: More inspectors, more frequent audits, more unannounced visits. Current capacity is inadequate for the number of institutions.
Risk-based targeting: Focus enforcement on institutions with high complaint rates, low placement rates, or other risk indicators.
Outcome requirements: Require institutions to track and report graduate outcomes. Make renewal contingent on demonstrated graduate success, not just compliance with input standards.
Assessment separation: Separate training from assessment. Institutions should not assess their own graduates. Independent assessment would improve credential reliability.
Complaint accessibility: Make complaint processes more accessible and responsive. Workers should be able to complain easily and see results.
Information transparency:
Outcome publication: Require and publish institution-level outcome data. Graduates should know what percentage of previous graduates found employment in their field.
Fee transparency: Require clear disclosure of all fees before enrollment. No hidden charges or post-enrollment additions.
Job order verification: Prohibit display of job orders unless the institution can document current, verified connections.
Student reviews: Create platforms for verified graduate reviews that institutions cannot suppress.
Market structure reform:
Public option expansion: Expand access to low-cost or free public TESDA training. If quality public options exist, predatory private centers lose market.
Quality incentives: Create incentives for quality, such as preferential treatment for institutions with strong graduate outcomes.
Entry barriers: Raise standards for new institution registration to exclude operators without genuine training capacity.
Exit enforcement: Actually close and prevent reopening of institutions with documented predatory practices.
Recruitment integration:
Pipeline regulation: Regulate training-recruitment connections. Prohibit undisclosed financial relationships between training centers and agencies.
Placement claims: Prohibit unverifiable placement claims. Require documentation of placement rates and outcomes.
Referral transparency: Require disclosure of any payments for student referrals.
What Workers Can Do
Pending systemic reform, workers can take steps to protect themselves.
Before enrolling:
Verify TESDA registration: Check TESDA’s website for institution registration. Unregistered institutions should be avoided entirely.
Research outcomes: Search for information about graduate outcomes. Look for complaints, reviews, and independent information beyond what the center provides.
Verify job claims: Do not believe job order displays without verification. Ask which agency holds the job order. Contact the agency directly to verify.
Compare options: Check multiple training centers for the same program. Compare fees, facilities, and claims. Significant price premiums should raise questions.
Visit facilities: Visit before enrolling. See the actual training facilities, not just offices or reception areas.
Ask hard questions: What is your placement rate? Can I speak with recent graduates? Which agencies do you work with? Get specific answers.
During enrollment:
Document everything: Keep copies of all documents, receipts, and marketing materials. Take photos or videos of facilities and promises.
Get promises in writing: Any promise about placement, timing, or outcomes should be in writing. If they refuse to write it, they probably will not deliver it.
Understand total cost: Get complete cost disclosure before starting. What are all fees, including assessments, materials, and anything else?
Connect with co-trainees: Build relationships with other trainees. Collective information sharing and potential collective action is more powerful than individual complaints.
After training:
Track time: Set expectations for placement timelines. If promised timelines pass without progress, escalate.
Document failures: Document when promises are not kept. Save communications showing excuses and delays.
Report problems: File complaints with TESDA. Even if individual complaints do not produce immediate results, patterns of complaints can trigger enforcement.
Share experiences: Share experiences on social media, community groups, and with potential future enrollees. Information protects others.
Pursue alternatives: Do not remain stuck waiting for a center that will not deliver. Pursue other agencies, other paths, other options.
Part 9: The Accountability Gap
Who Should Be Accountable
The training center cartel involves multiple parties who bear accountability for worker harm.
Training center owners and operators:
Primary accountability rests with those who design and profit from predatory operations:
Direct responsibility: They set fee levels, make promises, deliver (or fail to deliver) training, and capture profits.
Knowledge: They know when their training is inadequate, when their placement promises are false, when their graduates struggle.
Choice: They choose profit over worker welfare. They could operate differently but choose not to.
TESDA leadership and staff:
Regulatory failure makes TESDA complicit:
Oversight duty: TESDA has legal responsibility to ensure training quality. Systemic failure is TESDA failure.
Capacity choices: Decisions about enforcement capacity, priorities, and approaches are TESDA decisions.
Accountability gaps: TESDA does not face meaningful consequences when regulation fails.
Recruitment agencies:
Agencies that participate in training pipelines share accountability:
Pipeline participation: Agencies that refer workers to predatory training centers enable extraction.
Credential acceptance: Agencies that accept meaningless credentials without verifying competence perpetuate the system.
Promise chains: Agencies that make placement promises knowing they depend on training-side promises contribute to deception.
Government broadly:
The broader government context enables the problem:
Economic policy: Economic conditions that create OFW desperation enable exploitation.
Regulatory gaps: Gaps between TESDA, DTI, DOLE, and other agencies create spaces where predatory operators hide.
Political protection: Political connections that protect predatory operators enable continued operation.
Workers themselves?
Victim-blaming is tempting but misplaced:
Information asymmetry: Workers do not have information to evaluate training quality before enrollment.
Desperation context: Workers make decisions under economic pressure that limits options.
Trust betrayal: Workers trusted a system that appeared legitimate, with TESDA registration, official certificates, and government processes.
Workers are victims of a system designed to exploit them, not co-creators of their own victimization.
The Impunity Reality
Despite clear harms, accountability is rare.
Training center consequences:
Enforcement rarity: Most predatory centers continue operating without consequence. The probability of meaningful sanction is low.
Penalty inadequacy: When sanctions occur, penalties are often minor. Fines may be less than profits from a single batch of students.
Reopening ease: Closed centers can reopen under new names, new corporations, or different family members.
Criminal prosecution absence: Criminal prosecution for training fraud is extremely rare. Owners face civil or administrative consequences at most.
TESDA consequences:
Political insulation: TESDA leadership faces minimal consequences for regulatory failure. Performance is measured by enrollment numbers, not graduate outcomes.
Bureaucratic protection: Individual bureaucrats face career consequences more for disrupting the system than for allowing harm.
Information suppression: Negative information about training system failures is not widely publicized.
Agency consequences:
License retention: Agencies involved in predatory training pipelines typically retain licenses.
Reputation insulation: The connection between agencies and training failure is obscured. Agencies blame training centers; workers may not understand agency complicity.
The impunity calculation:
For predatory training center operators, the calculation is clear:
Expected profit: Significant (₱millions annually for larger operations) Expected penalty: Low probability, low magnitude if it occurs Net expected return: Highly positive
This calculation explains why predatory practices persist. The system rewards extraction and does not punish it.
Part 10: The Reckoning
The Debt to Workers
The Philippine training system owes workers an enormous debt.
The financial debt:
If ₱25 billion to ₱33 billion in annual profits are extracted through predatory training, the cumulative extraction over the past two decades exceeds ₱500 billion.
This is ₱500 billion taken from workers who could not afford it, often borrowed at predatory interest rates, for training that frequently led nowhere.
The opportunity debt:
Beyond money, the system owes workers years:
Years of job search: Waiting for placement that never came Years of debt repayment: Paying for training that provided nothing Years of foregone alternatives: Time that could have been spent on education or work that actually helped
The trust debt:
The system owes workers the trust it violated:
Institutional trust: Workers trusted TESDA registration and certification. That trust was exploited.
Community trust: Workers trusted recommendations from teachers, community members, and peers. Some of those recommendations were purchased.
Self-trust: Workers trusted their own judgment. Being deceived damaged that self-trust.
The future debt:
The system owes workers futures it stole:
Overseas careers that did not happen: The lives that workers planned and did not get to live.
Financial security not achieved: The savings, investments, and stability that overseas income would have enabled.
Family provision not possible: The education, healthcare, and opportunities that remittances would have funded.
The Path Forward
Addressing the training center cartel requires action at multiple levels.
For government:
Prioritize enforcement: Allocate resources to actually enforce training quality standards. Current enforcement is inadequate.
Outcome accountability: Measure and reward graduate outcomes, not just enrollment numbers and completion rates.
Pipeline regulation: Regulate the connections between training centers and recruitment agencies that enable coordinated extraction.
Public alternatives: Expand access to quality public training options that compete with predatory private centers.
Criminal accountability: Pursue criminal prosecution for clear fraud, creating deterrence that administrative penalties do not provide.
For civil society:
Documentation: Investigate and document predatory practices. Evidence enables advocacy and accountability.
Worker organizing: Help victimized workers organize, share information, and pursue collective action.
Legal support: Provide legal assistance to workers with viable claims. Test legal theories that could expand accountability.
Information dissemination: Spread information about predatory practices and warning signs. Informed workers are harder to victimize.
For international partners:
Employer engagement: Engage employers who hire Filipino workers to demand meaningful credentials. Employer pressure for quality could transform training.
Bilateral accountability: Include training quality in bilateral labor agreements. Destination countries have leverage that could drive reform.
Research support: Fund research on training effectiveness, credential value, and reform strategies.
For workers:
Information seeking: Seek information beyond what training centers provide. Use available resources to evaluate options.
Collective protection: Connect with other workers. Shared information and collective action are more powerful than individual efforts.
Complaint filing: Report problems to TESDA and other authorities. Even if individual cases do not produce results, patterns of complaints can trigger action.
Story sharing: Share experiences publicly. Shame predatory operators. Warn others.
The Question of Values
Ultimately, the training center cartel reflects societal choices about values.
What the current system values:
Profit over people: The system prioritizes training center profits over worker welfare.
Credentials over competence: The system prioritizes issuing certificates over developing actual skills.
Enrollment over employment: The system prioritizes getting students enrolled over getting graduates employed.
Appearances over outcomes: The system prioritizes institutional compliance appearances over graduate life outcomes.
What an ethical system would value:
Worker welfare: Training should serve workers, not extract from them.
Genuine competence: Credentials should represent real, verified skills.
Employment outcomes: Success should be measured by what graduates achieve, not by how many enroll.
Accountability: Those who harm workers should face consequences.
The choice:
The Philippines can continue operating a training system that extracts billions from its most vulnerable workers while preparing them for futures that never materialize.
Or it can build a system that actually serves workers: one where training develops real skills, credentials represent genuine competence, and the path from training to employment is something more than a lie told to separate workers from their money.
The current system is a choice. A different system is possible. What is lacking is not knowledge of the problem or solutions. What is lacking is will to change.
The Diploma on the Wall
The investigation began with a certificate on a wall in Laguna: 600 hours of training, TESDA certification, a future that never came.
That certificate represents millions of similar certificates: framed evidence of investment, symbols of hope, paper promises that dissolved when workers tried to redeem them.
The training centers that issued those certificates continue operating. They have new batches of students now, new promises, new job orders displayed, new urgency about limited slots and approaching deadlines.
The system that produced those worthless certificates continues functioning. TESDA registers new training centers. Assessment centers certify new graduates. Recruitment agencies accept new applicants with fresh certificates that may or may not represent any actual ability.
And workers continue believing. They see the certificates on walls in their communities. They hear the success stories (real and fabricated). They want what the training system promises. They pay what the training system charges.
Some will find overseas work. Their certificates will join success statistics. The system will cite them as evidence that training works.
Many more will join Jennifer, Mario, Rosemarie, and Eduardo. Their certificates will gather dust. Their debts will compound. Their dreams will not materialize.
The training center cartel will capture another ₱50 billion this year. Its owners will grow wealthier. Its victims will grow poorer. Its promises will continue to be worth less than the paper they are printed on.
This is the diploma mill of departure: an industry that has learned to harvest hope, to monetize desperation, to sell futures it has no intention of delivering.
The certificates hang on walls across the Philippines: evidence of faith, monuments to deception, reminders of how the system treats those who trust it.
The question is whether those certificates will continue to represent betrayal, or whether the system can be transformed so that they represent what they claim to represent: genuine skills, real opportunity, paths to futures that actually arrive.
That transformation is possible. But it requires confronting the cartel that profits from the current system, the regulators who enable it, and the political will that prioritizes other interests over worker welfare.
Until then, the certificates will continue to accumulate on walls across the Philippines: worthless treasures, framed lies, diplomas from the mills of departure.